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The supposition of common sense and naïve realism, 
that we see the actual physical object, is very hard to 
reconcile with the scientific view that our perception 
occurs somewhat later than the emission of light by 
the object…  
 
                    —      B. Russell (, p. ) 
 
 
Why should it not be admitted that our eyes can 
range into the past…? 
       
               —      A. J. Ayer (, p. ) 
 
Abstract: It seems possible to see a star that no longer exists. Yet, it also seems right 
to say that what no longer exists cannot be seen. We therefore face a puzzle, the 
traditional answer to which involves abandoning naïve realism in favour of a sense 
datum view. In this paper, however, I oﬀer a novel exploration of the puzzle within 
a naïve realist framework. As will emerge, the best option for naïve realists is to 
embrace an eternalist view of time, and to claim that in the relevant case, one sees a 
still existent star-stage that is located somewhere in the distant past. 
 
  Introduction 
 
Suppose you look up at the sky on a clear night. There are many visible stars, but 
you decide to focus on just one. Suppose further that, as it happens, what is dis-
tinctive about the star you choose to focus on is that, unlike the other stars it no 
longer exists, having exploded and then ‘died’ hundreds of years ago. (This situa-
tion seems quite possible, given the finite speed at which light travels, and the 
great distance between ourselves and the heavenly bodies above.) 
 I submit that regarding this case, it is natural, at least initially, to think that 
both of the following claims are true, namely, 
  




 () The star no longer exists. 
 
  
At the same time, however, one could be forgiven for thinking that these two 
claims simply cannot be true at once. For it is far from clear whether we can really 
make sense of something being seen despite no longer existing. As C. E. M. Joad 
appositely puts it, in connection with a similar case, the idea that ‘one can see 
what no longer exists’ seems just ‘absurd’ (, p. ). What is no longer a part 
of reality seems to have no capacity for being seen. (In what follows let us refer to 
this as the Existence Principle. Cf. § below.) 
 The case described, therefore, seems somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, 
the most natural and intuitive description of that case entails that claims () and 
() are both correct. For it seems plausible, at least at first, to say that in the rele-
vant case you see a star that no longer exists. Yet on the other hand, the principle 
stating that only things that still exist are able to be seen seems very plausible as 
well. The trouble is that this principle entails that () and () are logically incom-
patible. For if only the things that still exist are able to be seen, then () entails 
the negation of (), and vice versa. 
 What is the right way to proceed here? What we have, of course, is a quite 
general puzzle, one that we all face regardless of our specific views regarding the 
nature of perceptual experience. There is, however, a traditional answer to the 
puzzle, one that involves adopting a sense datum theory of perceptual experience.1 
That is, the traditional response is to adopt the view that in general, having a per-
ceptual experience is a matter of being acquainted or presented with some non-
physical sense datum. Seeing an external item, on this theory, is then a matter of 
that thing causing, in the right kind of way, an appropriate perceptual experience 
in one (whose intrinsic nature can be exhaustively characterised independently of 
the external item that is seen). 
 How does this help us to resolve the paradox? The answer—so goes the tradi-
tional thought—is that it allows us to reject the Existence Principle. On the sense 
datum view, seeing an object, O, is a matter of having some visual experience, E, 
that has been caused by O in the appropriate way (whereby E’s intrinsic nature 
can be characterised independently of O). Therefore, since it is possible for O to 
cause such an experience in the right way (i.e., so that it counts as a perceptual 
experience of O) even if O no longer exists by the time that E begins, it follows 
that the Existence Principle is false, which means that the problem which we be-
gan with is dissolved.2  
 On the sense datum view, therefore, when you look up at the sky, you have a 
visual experience which consists in you being acquainted with a sense datum. 
(Since the sense datum exists at the present moment, there is no problem about 
your now being acquainted with it.) However, in this situation, it is also true that 
you are seeing the deceased star (albeit ‘indirectly’). The reason why you count as 
seeing the star is that the star causes your perceptual experience in the appropriate 
                                               
1 See for example Ayer (, p. ), Broad (, esp. p. ; , pp. —), Joad 
(, p. ), Moore (, p. ﬀ), and Russell (, p. ; , pp. —; ,  
p. ). For a contemporary defence of this response see Robinson (, pp. —). 
2 Well, one might wonder how exactly something that no longer exists can be the cause of 
something that still does. I address this kind of objection shortly, see n. . below.  
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way; i.e. in the way that makes for genuine perception.3 The central thought is 
that, given this view of matters, one can maintain, with Chisholm (, p. ), 
that perceiving an extinct star ‘is no more paradoxical than the action of such a 
star on a photographic plate or its reflection in the water’. This is because there is 
no problem about supposing that a star might cause one to have an ‘sense datum 
experience’ even whilst not being in existence at the time that the experience it 
generates occurs.4 
 Now in point of fact, one can adopt what is in eﬀect this traditional line of  
response without having to embrace the sense datum theory. For in place of the 
sense datum theory, one could adopt some form of adverbialism (along with 
Chisholm: ), or else some form of intentionalism, along with most contem-
porary philosophers (cf. Dretske: , pp. —), and yet still be able to reject 
the Existence Principle as the sense datum theorist does. In short, given any 
‘Conjunctivist’ view whatsoever, one can dissolve the paradox by rejecting the 
Existence Principle. For given Conjunctivism, one can hold that, when one sees 
the star, one has an experience whose intrinsic nature is independent of the star 
itself. The idea would then be that, due to the fact that the star produces the expe-
rience in the right kind of way, the experience that one has counts as a perception 
of it. One thus visually perceives the star even though the star no longer exists, 
whereby this is possible because (i) perceiving the star is a matter of having an 
experience appropriately caused by the star, and because (ii) the star can cause 
one’s experience in the appropriate way despite no longer existing when the expe-
rience occurs.5   
 This, then, is the traditional way to respond to the quite general problem in-
volving the deceased star. In this paper, however, I want to set aside this tradi-
tional Conjunctivist response. This is because I want instead to explore how the 
problem-case involving the star might be resolved within the context of a naïve 
realist view, and so a view that entails Disjunctivism and, therefore, the rejection 
                                               
3 In place of causal conditions one might instead appeal to counter-factual conditions or to 
the notion of ‘matching’. For relevant discussion see Lewis () and Johnston (). 
4 Another part of the traditional response is the idea that the Existence Principle itself is plau-
sible only because we tend to presuppose in our everyday thought a naïve realist view of perceptu-
al experience, on which perceptual experiences consist in the presentation of the external items 
that we see or sense (cf. §). For if this naïve realist view were true, then, as C. D. Broad (,  
p. ) points out with such great clarity, the Existence Principle would indeed seem rather hard 
to deny (cf. § of this paper for further argument to that eﬀect).  
5 One caveat should be made here with respect to the idea that all Conjunctivist theories of 
experience can respond in the manner that I’ve just set out. This is because it is not entirely clear 
whether the advocates of singular content intentionalism can reject the Existence Principle so easily 
(cf. n.  below). (But then again, it can be argued that singular content intentionalism is really a 
Disjunctivist theory, rather than a form of Conjunctivism. In this connection cf. Tye: .) 
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of Conjunctivism.6 There are in fact several reasons why focusing on naïve realism 
in particular is worthwhile, which I shall presently set out.7 
  One main reason is that, as we will see, naïve realists cannot endorse the tra-
ditional line of response that is available to Conjunctivists (cf. §); that is, they 
cannot deny the Existence Principle. For this immediately raises the question as 
to what naïve realists should say regarding our initial problem. In the recent per-
ception literature, there has been a surge of interest in naïve realism, and so it’s 
well worth working out what exactly naïve realists should say regarding the prob-
lem involving the deceased star.  
 A second, related reason for focusing on naïve realism in particular is that the 
case involving the deceased star has traditionally been used to show that the naïve 
realist view of perceptual experience is false.8 Indeed, this kind of argument was 
viewed by many, including Bertrand Russell and C. D. Broad, as being just as 
eﬀective against the naïve realist as any argument from illusion or from hallucina-
tion might be. Yet in the current literature, while the various problems involving 
illusion and hallucination that naïve realists face remain widely discussed, the case 
involving the deceased star (and the associated ‘time-lag argument’) are not.9 This 
means that a potentially deep problem for naïve realism remains very much un-
der-explored at the present time. The current essay aims to rectify matters, at least 
to some extent, by considering what naïve realists should say regarding the prob-
lem case involving the star. 
 What I shall argue, in eﬀect, is that the naïve realist’s only hope is to adopt an 
‘eternalist’ view of time, according to which past objects exist just as much as pre-
sent objects do. If that is right, however, then it turns out that (perhaps surpris-
ingly) naïve realists, despite the fact that they endorse what many take to be the 
common sense view of perceptual experience, are unable to accept what many 
take to be the common sense view regarding the nature of time, namely pre-
sentism: the view that only what is located at the present moment exists. Whereas 
the various rival ‘Conjunctive’ theories of perception do seem to be able to adopt 
the common sense presentist view. (For as a Conjunctivist one can maintain that 
whilst one’s presently occurring experience does exist, the star that caused it no 
longer exists, which is precisely what presentism predicts.10) The point is that the-
                                               
6 Roughly speaking, a Conjunctive theory of perceptual experience is one according to which 
all experiences, whether veridical hallucinatory, have the same basic nature. Whereas Disjunc-
tivism is the negation of that claim. For further discussion regarding Conjunctivism vs. Disjunc-
tivism see Crane (), Johnston (), Martin (, ), and Pautz (). 
7 Just to be clear, by ‘naïve realism’ I mean to denote the view defended by Campbell (, 
), Brewer (, ), and Martin (, , ), amongst others. Anyone who en-
dorses this naïve realist view must be a Disjunctivist rather than a Conjunctivist, holding that 
perceptual experiences (those that we have when we actually perceive things) have a diﬀerent na-
ture to hallucinatory experiences (cf. Martin: ,  and Snowdon: a).  
8 See for example the various discussions of the ‘time-lag argument’ in the writings of C. D. 
Broad and Bertrand Russell. (Perhaps the briefest but clearest version of the kind of argument that 
I have in mind against naïve realism can be found in Broad (, p. ﬀ).  
9 One exception is Rashbrook-Cooper (manuscript), see also Fish (, p. ﬀ, & p. ). 
 10 Is it clear that Conjunctivists can embrace a presentist view? Well, one might argue that 
this is not in fact so clear, since on the Conjunctivist view of the case involving the star, the star 
causes the experience one is presently undergoing. Yet one might also think that it’s not in general 
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se are surely important results to establish (if indeed they are genuine results). For 
it surely matters to the contemporary debate regarding naïve realism to discover 
that if one endorses naive realism then one has to reject presentism in favour of 
eternalism, especially given that by holding on to a Conjunctivist view one can 
retain a presentist view of time. This is in eﬀect the third main reason why it is 
worth focusing on the naïve realist view in particular in relation to the general 
problem involving the star. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe 
the naïve realist view of perceptual experience in detail (§). I then explore the 
various options available to the naïve realist for diﬀusing the problem we began 
with, concluding that if naïve realists are to oﬀer an adequate interpretation of 
this case, they must endorse eternalism about time. (§§—). I conclude in (§). 
 
  Naïve Realism  
 
Naïve realism is a theory about the nature of perceptual experience, i.e. the kind 
of experience involved in cases of genuine perception. It comprises two central 
claims. The first concerns the structure of perceptual experience. The claim is that 
each perceptual experience consists in the sensory presentation of some external 
object to the perceiving subject. From this aspect of naïve realism, it follows that 
                                                                                                                           
possible for one thing to stand in a causal relation to another unless they both exist. (The best way 
to motivate this claim I think would be to rely on the ‘Principle of Relations’, which states that 
whenever a relation holds between any set of objects, all of the objects in that set exist.) But obvi-
ously, if the star has to exist in order to cause the experience one is now having, then Conjunc-
tivists cannot coherently claim both doesn’t exist and yet causes one’s experience. So it appears 
that the traditional Conjunctivist response entails the existence of the deceased star after all, and 
hence necessitates the rejection of presentism too. 
 I want to make two points here. Firstly, I think that anyone attracted to a presentist view 
both can and should deny that in general, in order for one thing to stand in a relation to another 
thing, both of those things have to exist (cf. Hinchcliﬀe: ). (Obviously, however, engaging 
with this debate in any greater detail would take us too far afield.) But if that’s right, then Con-
junctivists who want to endorse presentism can say that whilst the star does indeed cause the expe-
rience one is now having, it doesn’t follow that the star has to exist. The second point is that even 
if the above line of thought shows that Conjunctivists cannot be presentists, it does so by showing 
that presentism as such is false. For there are evidently manifold cases wherein a past object is the 
cause of a present object, so that if presentism is to be viable, it has to be possible for past, and 
therefore non-existent, objects to stand in causal relations to present things that do exist. (Cf. con-
temporary discussions of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ for presentism in (for instance) 
Crisp: , Clercq: , Hinchcliﬀe:  and Inman: .) Whereas what I intend to show 
here is that even if presentism as such is unproblematic, naïve realists still cannot be presentists, due 
to the fact that they must reject presentism to handle the problem involving the deceased star. 
Accordingly, we still end up with an interesting diﬀerence between naïve realism and the various 
Conjunctive views, viz. that while if Conjunctivists have a problem retaining presentism, this is 
only because presentism as such is undermined by the problem of cross-temporal relations, where-
as naïve realists have to abandon presentism even if the problem of cross-temporal relations can be 
dealt with, due to the fact that naïve realists need to address the initial problem case involving the 
star yet can do this eﬀectively only by rejecting presentism in favour of an eternalist position (see 
§). (Interestingly, then, we learn something noteworthy about presentism here as well: viz. that 
whilst it is widely taken to be the naïve view of time, it is incompatible with the commonsense 
view of perceptual experience, i.e. with naïve realism.) 
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our perceptual experiences are relational in nature, and contain external objects as 
constituents.  
 The second core claim of naïve realism concerns phenomenology. The claim is 
that our perceptual experiences derive their distinctive phenomenal characters (at 
least in part) from the external objects they present, and from the sensible quali-
ties these manifest. As Kalderon (a, p. ) appositely puts it, the core idea is 
that when I perceive (for example) a red tomato, the conscious character of my 
perceptual experience ‘depends on, and derives from’, the qualitative character of 
the tomato that I see. More generally, as Martin (, pp. —) observes, the 
naïve realist maintains that it is ‘the actual objects of perception…and the proper-
ties which they…manifest to one when perceived, [that] partly constitute one’s 
conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience’.   
 One interesting upshot of this latter commitment is that naïve realists have to  
accept what might be called a radically non-Galilean ontology—i.e., an ontology 
that, far from kicking the sensible qualities upstairs, into our minds, rather locates 
those sensible qualities within the external world we see and sense. As Campbell 
(, p. ) puts it, naïve realism ‘depends on the idea that qualitative proper-
ties are in fact characteristics of the world we observe’, whereby this is because, 
according to naïve realism, ‘our experiences have the qualitative characters…they 
do in virtue of the fact that they are relations to those aspects of the world’. 
 Naïve realism is thus a radically externalistic view about the nature of percep-
tual experience. For it implies that our perceptual experiences, rather than being 
‘narrow’ mental events which occur just inside the  head, instead reach all the way 
out to the external things they are of and thereby ‘literately include the world’ 
(Martin: , p. ).11 As Logue (, p. ) observes, on naïve realism, our 
perceptual experiences ‘literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass 
what the experience is of’. 
 With the naïve realist theory set out, I want to return to initial the case, 
sketched at the start of the paper, wherein you see, or at least seem to see, a dis-
tant and no longer extant star. The problem is that on the one hand, the follow-
ing two claims seem to describe the case correctly: 
 




  () The star no longer exists. 
 
Yet on the other hand, the Existence Principle, which tells us that if an object no 
longer exists, then it cannot be seen, seems very plausible. The trouble is, again, 
that by the Existence Principle, it follows that either () or () is false.  
 What should we say, as naïve realists, in order to dissolve the problem here? 
There are of course three options: reject claim (), reject claim (), or reject the 
                                               
11 The metaphor of our experiences reaching out to the external objects seen and sensed is 
employed by many naïve realists. See for example Campbell (, p. ), Johnston (,  
p. ), and Snowdon (, pp. —). 
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Existence Principle. These options will be explored in the remaining sections 
(§§—). I will first consider whether the naïve realist can follow the sense da-
tum theorist in giving up the Existence Principle. My answer here will be nega-
tive. This means that the naïve realist has to give up either () or (). These two 
options will be considered in (§) and (§) respectively.  
 
  The Existence Principle 
 
The sense datum theorist responds to our puzzle by rejecting the Existence Prin-
ciple. A more precise statement of that principle is as follows: 
 
 Existence Principle 
   It is not possible to see something that no longer exists. 
 
In this section, my aim is to see whether the naïve realist can follow suit. The an-
swer I shall argue for is that she can’t. Unlike the sense datum theorist, or the 
Conjunctivist more generally, the naïve realist cannot dissolve our puzzle by re-
jecting the claim that what no longer exists is unable to be seen.12  
 On the naïve realist view, seeing involves having a perceptual experience 
which consists in the visual presentation of the external items one perceives. The 
external things thus presented to one—or, alternatively, with which one is ac-
quainted—are therefore constituents of one’s perceptual experience. My first 
point is that it is diﬃcult to see how something that no longer exists—i.e., that is 
no longer a part of reality at all—could be a constituent of a perceptual experi-
ence. That which does not exist has no capacity to constitute, even in part, some-
thing that does exist. But if that’s right, then no perceptual experience could have 
something no longer in existence as a constituent.13 If that’s correct, however, 
then the Existence Principle appears to follow. Naïve realism, therefore, seems to 
entail that the Existence Principle is true.14  
                                               
12 According to Le Morvan (, p. ) those who endorse a ‘direct realist’ theory of per-
ception should say that in the star case you are aware of something that ‘no longer exists’ (cf. Ayer: 
, p.  and Snowdon: , p. ). However, if naïve realism counts as a form of what Le 
Morvan calls ‘direct realism’, then is not correct. For unlike the proponent of the sense datum 
theory (or any other Conjunctivist view), the naïve realist cannot maintain that in the star case 
you see something that is no longer existent. Or so I will argue.  
13 In this connection, cf. Bill Fish (, p. ), who explicitly defines the relation of ac-
quaintance (which he appeals to in stating his version of naïve realism), as an ‘irreducible mental 
relation…that the subject can only stand in to objects that exist’. See also Martin (, p. ).  
14 A similar point can be made regarding singular content intentionalism. On this view, see-
ing something involves having a perceptual experience that, in its nature, consists in ‘visually en-
tertaining’ a singular proposition, which has the object seen as a constituent. Since it is generally 
held that only existent things can be constituents of singular propositions, this view also seems to 
entail that the Existence Principle is false. (One might reply here, however, by giving up the idea 
that singular propositions cannot have things that no longer exist as constituents. For this move, 
in connection with the deceased star case, see Snowdon: , p. .) Moreover, if the proposi-
tion is a constituent of the experience, and if the object seen is a constituent of the proposition, 
then by transitivity the object seen would appear to be a constituent of the experience (cf. Haw-
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 A second point is worth making in this connection. On the naïve realist view, 
the core phenomenal character of one’s experience is determined by the sensible 
qualities manifested by the objects one is presented with. (On the notion of ‘core’ 
phenomenal character see Brewer: .) However, if something no longer exists, 
then it manifests no visible qualities. Therefore, something that no longer exists is 
not able to determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience. So this pro-
vides yet further reason for thinking that if naïve realism is true, then one cannot 
be visually presented with, and hence cannot be said to see, items that no longer 
exist. Indeed, on a plausible interpretation, what the naïve realist maintains is that 
something is seen only if it contributes to the phenomenal character of the experi-
ence one has. For arguably, part of what it is for something to be sensorily pre-
sented to one, in the sense that the naïve realist intends, is for it to contribute to 
the core phenomenology of one’s experiential state, via the sensible qualities that 
it manifests. So if the star does not exist, and hence does not manifest any visible 
qualities—so that it cannot even partly constitute the phenomenal character of an 
experience—then it follows that according to naïve realism the star is not visually 
presented to one. But this then seems to imply that the star is not seen.15 
 These points seem compelling. However, there is one way in which a naïve 
realist wishing to reject the Existence Principle might respond. The way to re-
spond would be to deny that seeing something necessarily involves having an ex-
perience that consists in the visual presentation of that thing. Compare here the 
sense datum view, according to which it is sense data, rather than the physical 
things we (indirectly) see, that are the items visually presented to us. On the sense 
datum view, we are presented with sense data, but we also (indirectly) see external 
things that are not visually presented to us. The present thought is that perhaps 
the naïve realist could adopt a similar view. 
 How would this work? The proposal I have in mind is this. In the case involv-
ing the star, one has a visual experience that consists in the visual presentation of 
something other than the star—something that still exists. However, one also 
counts as seeing the star—indirectly if you will—in virtue of being visually pre-
sented with that thing. The idea is that so long as the thing one is visually pre-
sented with stands in some appropriate relation to the deceased star, then in hav-
ing the specific visual experience that consists in the visual presentation of that 
thing one will thereby see the no longer existent star.  
                                                                                                                           
thorne & Kovakovich: , fn. ). But once again, nothing that no longer exists, it seems, 
could even partly constitute an experience that does exist.  
15 One might object that this line of thought ignores the possibility of a Meinongian view, on 
which the star does not exist but is still able to bear properties and have relations. (It is definitive 
of the Meinongian theory, I take it, that even non-existent things have properties and stand in 
relations.) Given this view, the non-existent star and its qualities could apparently constitute one’s 
experiential state. The trouble, however, is that this view is just implausible: even if there are 
Meinongian objects that can have properties and stand in relations whilst failing to exist, it is sure-
ly not the case that when a star goes out of existence, it becomes a Meinongian object which con-
tinues to manifest various visible properties and relations. (Note also that on this Meinongian 
view, a non-existent item (the star) would partly constitute a fully existent item—namely, one’s 
perceptual experience. But surely that is not possible. If an entity is real, if it exists, then it is not 
made up, even in part, by things that do not exist.) 
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 To make this work, one would have to find a suitable ‘surrogate’ object, to 
take the place of the deceased star as the object of acquaintance—i.e., as the item 
that is visually presented to you when you look up at the night sky. The obvious 
suggestion is that in the relevant case, what one is acquainted with is the percepti-
ble light produced by the star, which still exists at the time of your experience (cf. 
Suchting: , pp. —). Since the light you are acquainted with is causally 
related to the star in the appropriate way, one’s perceptual experience could plau-
sibly count as ‘indirect’ perception of the star itself. (Seeing the star by virtue of 
being acquainted with its light would be analogous, perhaps, to perceiving a car 
by hearing the sound that it produces, or to seeing an object by seeing its facing 
front. Such cases of perceiving one thing by virtue of perceiving another count as 
cases of ‘indirect’ perception in the precise sense articulated by Jackson: . 
And arguably, it is not incompatible with naïve realism to hold that some cases of 
perception are ‘indirect’ in this specific sense; cf. Johnston: manuscript.)  
 The trouble with this view, however, is that it is insuﬃciently general. In the 
case involving the deceased star, we can perhaps locate an appropriate ‘surrogate’ 
to stand in as the object of acquaintance, viz., the perceptible light produced by 
the deceased star. However, there are other, relevantly similar cases wherein it is 
much harder to find a suitable surrogate object. Suppose, for example, that I look 
over at the orange flowers on my desk. And suppose also that in the very short 
time it takes for the light leaving those flowers to reach my eyes, they are instan-
taneously destroyed. Here it is much harder to locate a surrogate object of ac-
quaintance. There is, I submit, no analogue in this situation for the still-extant 
patch of perceptible light that was produced by the deceased star.16 More general-
ly, we could have raised our initial puzzle using a diﬀerent case and a quite diﬀer-
ent perceptible object, whereby the chosen object would not leave behind any 
perceptible light (or any ‘surrogate object of acquaintance whatsoever) were it to 
be destroyed just prior to the perceptual experience one has of it beginning.17 
                                               
16 There might be a variety of cases wherein the object that one sees will leave a portion of vis-
ible light behind after destruction. Suppose for instance that I see my computer screen, but that it 
too, like the flowers, gets destroyed before the relevant stream of photons reaches my eyes. Here, 
plausibly, there will be a tiny portion of visible light left behind by the screen that could act as a 
surrogate object of acquaintance. However, the initial point still stands, namely, that the ‘find a 
surrogate object of acquaintance strategy’ is insuﬃciently general. For it is only in a small number 
of cases, and certainly not in every case, that the relevant object will leave a portion of perceptible 
light (or indeed any surrogate object of acquaintance) behind after it is destroyed.  
17 According to O’Shaughnessy (), in all cases of vision, one sees a physical object via see-
ing the light that it emits. Given this view, one could maintain that in every case of physical object 
perception, one is visually presented with light, which acts as the visual surrogate for the no longer 
extant physical object that one sees in the relevant set of ‘time-lag’ cases. However, it seems to me 
that this view has little to recommend it. There are indeed special cases in which we see light—as 
when for example we see the beam of a torch—but, contra O’Shaughnessy, such cases are not the 
norm. On the contrary, Chisholm (, p. ) is basically correct when he claims that in gen-
eral, whilst ‘light waves…may stimulate the receptors of [a subject], and cause him to sense in 
certain ways…we do not wish to say that the light waves…thereby appear to [the subject]’. In this 
connection cf. also Smart (, p. ). (Perhaps O’Shaughnessy has failed to take proper note of 
the crucial distinction between perceptible and imperceptible light. It is true that all visual experi-
ence involves imperceptible light—i.e.  light waves or streams of photons stimulating the relevant 
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 I submit, therefore, that naïve realists cannot resolve our puzzle by following 
the sense datum theorist (or more generally, the Conjunctivist) in rejecting the 
Existence Principle. It follows that in order to resolve the puzzle, the naïve realist 
must reject either () or (). I will explore both of these options in the following 
two sections. We will begin with the question as to whether the naïve realist can 
reject claim ().  
 
  Seeming to See 
 
One way to react to our initial puzzle is to assimilate the case of seeing the star to 
that of ‘seeing’ something in hallucination. That is to say, one might think that in 
the relevant case, one does not see the star, but only seems to see a star—just as in 
hallucination, one does not see anything but merely seems to do so. For example, 
in the case wherein Macbeth hallucinates a bloody dagger, we might initially 
speak of the dagger Macbeth sees. We would be quick to add, however, that as 
there is in fact no dagger there, there is in fact no dagger Macbeth really sees. 
Macbeth seems to see something but there is nothing he actually sees. Rather, he 
merely seems to see. Thus is not the case that: 
 
 (*) Macbeth sees the bloody dagger. 
 
Again the reason why (*) is not true is that there is no bloody dagger there to see. 
In place of (*), what is really the case is that: 
 
 (+) Macbeth seems to see a dagger, but does not actually see anything. 
 
The present suggestion is that in the star case, since there is actually no star to see 
(there used to be; but that star no longer exists), it is not true that you see any-
thing when you look up and seem to see a star. Rather you seem to see a star but 
there is nothing there to see. So is not the case that: 
 
 () You see the star. 
 
Rather, what is the case instead is that: 
 
 (*) You seem to see a star, but do not actually see anything.18 
 
If this is right—that is to say, if () really is false—then our puzzle dissolves. We 
can hold on to (), and to the general principle that what no longer exists cannot 
be seen, and yet avoid a contradiction by saying that () is false. 
                                                                                                                           
sense-organs—but it does not follow that all cases of seeing involve the presence of portions of 
visible light conceived as visible items in their own right.) 
18 Of course you might perhaps see something—the sky for example, or perhaps one’s out-
stretched arms. In short, if the star case is a case of hallucination, then it will be a case of partial 
rather than total hallucination. (Compare e.g. the case where Macbeth hallucinates a dagger but 
really sees the wall that he hallucinates the dagger as being in front of.) 
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 This sub-section argues against this view. Unlike the case of having an  
hallucination, seeing a star that no longer exists really does involve seeing, as op-
posed to merely seeming to see. So it is misguided to try to assimilate the case of 
seeing a star that no longer exists to ‘seeing’ a dagger that is in fact unreal. 
 My first point can be put in this way. Hallucinations are strange and unusual 
in a particular sort of way. They occur, as Johnston (, p. ) puts it, when 
the ‘visual system misfires’.19 However, when one looks up into the sky to see a 
distant star, even a star that no longer exists, there is no sense in which the visual 
system misfires. Rather in such cases, it seems that what we have is just an ordi-
nary case of perception, and hence an ordinary case of seeing. As G. E. Myers 
writes, when discussing the kind of case we are considering: 
 
What is peculiar here, of course, is not some breach in nature’s laws, or [that of] 
hallucination or delusion on our part in claiming to see a star, but simply the 
length of time required for light to travel distances. (, pp. —) 
 
Accordingly, it looks implausible to treat the case in which you look up and (seem 
to) see a no longer existent star as in eﬀect a case of hallucination. For what we 
seem to have in such cases is simply genuine perception, and hence genuine see-
ing—albeit genuine perception that takes place after the object of perception has 
ceased to be. (N.b. even if one denies that hallucinating always involves ‘the per-
ceptual system misfiring’, we can agree that in some sense one has an hallucinatory 
experience only when things ‘go wrong’ in a certain distinctive way. What I deny, 
however, and what I think the above passage from Myers brings out so well, is 
that things don’t ‘go wrong’ in the star case in the kind of way that would make it 
plausible to treat that case as one involving hallucination rather than genuine per-
ception.) 
 This point can be consolidated in the following way. Many theorists of percep-
tual experience accept the Conjunctivist idea to the eﬀect that there is just one 
basic type of experience, which is present in both perceptual and hallucinatory 
cases (cf. Martin: ). Proponents of naïve realism, however, cannot accept this 
view, and have to hold instead the Disjunctivist claim to the eﬀect that there are 
two basic types of experience, namely perceptual and hallucinatory experience, 
whereby these two experience-types have fundamentally diﬀerent natures. This is 
due to the fact that for naïve realists, perceptual experiences consist in the presen-
tation of external objects, yet this is obviously not true of hallucinatory experienc-
es. Thus, it follows that hallucinatory experiences must have diﬀerent natures to 
perceptual ones, so that perceptual and hallucinatory experiences and end up be-
ing experiences of fundamentally diﬀerent kinds. 
 For a naïve realist, therefore, having an hallucination—that is to say, having an 
experience that involves seeming to see, without actual seeing—is to have an expe-
rience of a completely diﬀerent kind to the sort of experience involved in ordinary 
perception. Therefore, in order to reject claim (), the naïve realist would have to 
say that in the case involving the deceased star, you have an experience of a radi-
                                               
19 This is of course true only of visual hallucination; hallucinations in other modalities involve 
the ‘misfiring’ of other relevant perceptual systems. For more on the idea that hallucinations are 
the product of what you get ‘when things go wrong’, understood in causal terms, see my (forth-
coming). 
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cally diﬀerent kind to the sort that is involved in ordinary cases of seeing. This 
view, however, looks rather hard to believe. There is, it must be granted, at least 
some plausibility to the idea that hallucinatory experiences are events that are fun-
damentally diﬀerent in kind to ordinary perceptual experiences.20 Again, halluci-
nations are strange and unusual in a particular sort of way; they seem to involve 
the ‘visual system misfiring’, and it does not seem too much of a stretch to think 
that they might be of a radically diﬀerent metaphysical kind to ordinary perceptu-
al ones. However, there is not the same level of plausibility to the idea that your 
experience, when you look up into the sky and (seem to) see the star, is radically 
diﬀerent in nature to the sort of experience involved in ordinary seeing. For when 
you look up and see the star, this situation is nothing like what happens in other 
cases of hallucination; nothing ‘goes wrong’, and the visual system does not ‘mis-
fire’; you simply look into the sky and seem to see a star (albeit one that happens 
no longer to exist). 
 This, I submit, provides one reason to think that we cannot treat () analo-
gously to (*). In a case of hallucination, one seems to see something but there is 
nothing that one sees.21 In the case involving the star, however, it seems that some-
thing is seen. For the case involving the star seems to be one of ordinary percep-
tion and nothing like a case of hallucination. 
 (What about treating the relevant case as being one of illusion rather than hal-
lucination? The trouble is that for naïve realists, there are only two options when it 
comes to illusory experiences; naïve realists can either treat these types of experi-
ence as a species of perceptual experience, or else view them as a species of halluci-
natory experience. In short, naïve realists can adopt either ‘PI/H Disjunctivism’ or 
else adopt ‘P/IH Disjunctivism’, to use the helpful terminology of Byrne and 
Logue: .22 However, if the naïve realist claims that illusory experiences are to 
                                               
20 One might of course disagree with this. However, this is a claim that the naïve realist has to 
make. So it is only those willing to rejecting naïve realism that can claim to find no plausibility in 
the idea that perceptual and hallucinatory experiences are diﬀerent kinds of mental event. 
21 There might of course be something with which one is visually presented with, as on so-
called Positive Disjunctivist views, according to which hallucinatory experiences present non-
normal objects (for views of this kind see Alston: , Johnston: , and Knight: ). Such  
objects, however, would not be perceived, and hence would not classify as being seen.  
22 There is perhaps one further option here. For it might be said that illusory experiences form 
a type or category of sense-experience all of their own, so that the disjunctivist does not have just 
two kinds of sense-experience within her ontology, viz. perceptual and hallucinatory, but rather 
three, viz. perceptual, illusory and hallucinatory. Given this kind of view, the naïve realist 
wouldn’t need to treat illusory experiences being as either a sub-class of hallucinatory or a sub-
class of perceptual experience: rather, illusory experiences would form a sui generis type of experi-
ential event. However, there are three problems. First, illusory experiences really do seem to be 
perceptual, for a case of illusion is precisely a case of perceiving something that appears other than it 
is. Second, to my knowledge no one has defended or developed this view (of illusions as involving 
a sui generis type of experience) in the literature, and so one doesn’t really know what to make of 
it. Then finally, and relatedly, there is worry thee, namely, that it is rather hard to see how adopt-
ing this view helps with dissolving our puzzle. What we need to do is reject () or () or the Exist-
ence Principle. But how does the ‘illusions as sui generis experience-types’ view help us to do this? 
That’s what would need spelling out. But I can’t see it adding anything new. It will surely collapse 
into rejecting ()—denying that the star is seen,--but then my arguments apply: (a) we mischarac-
  
be viewed as a type of perceptual experience (and thus adopts PI/H Disjunctivism, 
as most naïve realists do), then she will not be able to deny claim (), for obvious 
reasons, but this is the move we are presently considering.  Yet if the naïve realist 
takes the other option, i.e., if she claims that illusory experiences are a type of hal-
lucinatory experience, then the above line of argument against doing so will apply, 
and the naïve realist will still not have found a plausible way to reject claim (). 
Thus the naïve realist apparently gains nothing in terms of solving the puzzle that 
we began with if she considers the relevant experience as being illusory.23)  
 I will now present two further arguments for thinking that claim () is true (at 
least given that naïve realism is true), and, therefore, for thinking that the naïve 
realist cannot resolve the paradox by rejecting that premise. Both of these argu-
ments aim to show that if we reject (), then we have to embrace the absurd idea 
that we never see external objects. The first argument we can call the Generalising 
Argument. The second we can call the Modal Argument. Let us consider each in 
turn.  
 To begin with, consider the view that in the case of the deceased star, what  
actually happens is that you do not (directly) see the star, but rather (directly) see a 
‘sense datum’, which is an item that’s distinct from the star and from all other or-
dinary physical objects (cf. §). Many philosophers have argued for this view 
about this type of case. But in addition, they have argued that if, in the star case, 
you see only a sense datum and not the star, then it follows that in every case of 
perception, what one perceives is a sense datum, rather than the physical object one 
takes oneself to be seeing. The present point I want to make is that this ‘generalis-
ing’ move looks plausible. Once it is granted that in the star case one sees only a 
sense datum, it should be granted that the same is true of all putative cases of 
physical object perception.   
 The reason why this generalising move looks plausible is that all perception 
involves a ‘time-lag’. As Foster (, p. ) notes, when Pauline looks at the 
apple in her hand (to use Foster’s example), ‘it takes [time] for light to travel from 
the surface of the apple to her eyes, and…for her eyes to send the relevant signals 
to her brain’. But this means that her ‘visual experience at any moment is causally 
responsive to the state of the apple at a fractionally earlier moment’ (ibid). The 
point is that since all perception involves a time-lag, it follows that if the time-lag 
in the star case implies that the star is not actually seen, but rather that some sense 
                                                                                                                           
terise illusions as not involving seeing the object and (b) we wrongly say that we do not see the 
star when clearly we do. 
23 That said, I will later argue that on a naïve realist view, there is something illusory about the 
experience involving the star as with all similar experiences, since such experiences present to us a 
past object as being present when it is not. See (§.) for discussion of this idea. That said, I will 
later argue that on a naïve realist view, there is something illusory about the experience involving 
the star as with all similar experiences, since such experiences present to us a past object as being 
present when it is not. See (§.) for discussion of this idea. (Does this view this help us with dis-
solving our original puzzle (i.e. giving up (), () or the Existence Principle)? In short, I think it is 
quite clear that it does not. Rather, the truth as I see it is as follows: since we are naïve realists, to 
dissolve the puzzle we have to reject the Existence Principle, by adopting a non-presentist view of 
time; then, once we do this, we have to say that there’s an illusory element to all cases wherein we 
perceive temporally distant items, insofar as those item are given to use as being temporally pre-
sent when they are not. Again see §..) 
  
datum is seen instead, then the time-lag always involved in cases of physical object 
perception implies that the physical object is not (directly) seen, but rather that 
some sense datum is (directly) seen instead. Here is Ayer forcefully making the 
point: 
 
But if in these cases [such as the case involving the deceased star], we are not to say 
that we see the physical object, then we should not say it even in the case where the 
time interval is negligibly small; for the comparative length of the interval makes no 
diﬀerence to the character of our experience: there would be no justification for 
maintaining that we saw an object of one kind when the interval was very short, 
and an object of an entirely diﬀerent kind when it was somewhat longer. At what 
point in the continuous series of possible time intervals would this fundamental 
change take place? (, p. , cf. Broad: , p. ; Suchting: , p. ) 
 
The point seems plausible. If in the star case one sees a sense datum rather than 
the star, then since a time-lag is involved in all cases of seeing, it follows that in all 
cases one sees a sense datum rather than the physical object.24  
 Moreover, it appears to me that we can make the same basic point without 
invoking sense data. Suppose one denies that in the star case one actually sees the 
star. Then I submit that, since a time-lag is involved in all cases of perception, 
then by parity of reasoning, one must say that in all cases of perception, one does 
not see the relevant physical object, but only seems to do so. For to say otherwise 
would be to say that relatively long time-lags involve failing to see the object, 
whilst shorter ones do not. This ruling, however, looks completely arbitrary. To 
quote Ayer once more: ‘At what point in the continuous series of possible time 
intervals would this fundamental change [between seeing and not seeing the rele-
vant physical object] take place?’  
 This is the Generalising Argument for holding on to (). The fundamental 
idea is that we cannot reject () because if we do, then we have to embrace the ab-
surd conclusion that we never see the physical objects that we seem, in perceptual 
experience, to see. (Or at least, that we never see such objects in the direct, most 
basic way.) For to maintain that whilst you do not see the star, nevertheless you 
do, in the more ordinary cases, see the relevant physical object, would require 
maintaining that whilst a lengthy time-lag involves failing to see the object, a 
shorter time-lag is compatible with seeing the object. But this, in turn, would re-
quire holding that at some arbitrary point within the continuous series of possible 
time-lags, a ‘fundamental change’—between seeing and not seeing the relevant 
physical thing—takes place.25 
                                               
24 Of course, the sense datum theorist would not deny that one sees the physical object in any 
sense. Rather, she would insist that one sees the physical object ‘indirectly’, via seeing the sense 
datum in the more basic, direct sense. As Ayer (, p. ) writes ‘it seems too paradoxical to 
deny that we see physical objects in any sense at all’. Therefore, ‘the solution oﬀered [by the sense 
datum theorist] is that we see them only indirectly…’ (cf. §).  
25 A similar point can be made in connection with illusion. To handle the cases of illusion, 
and the problem that these pose for naïve realism, the naïve realist might be tempted to treat illu-
sions as experiential episodes of a diﬀerent kind to fully veridical perceptions. However, if the 
naïve realist were to make this move, then she would have to say that at some point along a con-
tinuous series, moving from fully veridical to illusory cases, the subject would have a radically 
diﬀerent kind of experience. Yet this position seems implausible. For it is hard to find a non-
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 There is a perhaps way to reply to this argument. What might be said is that 
the reason why one sees the physical object in some cases, but not in others, de-
spite the fact that all cases involve a time-lag, is that in some cases, but not others, 
the physical object no longer exists by the time the relevant experience starts. On 
this view, there is no arbitrary cut-oﬀ, but rather a cut-oﬀ that is principled: some 
cases involve seeing whilst others do not because of the important fact that in 
some situations, but not in others, the physical object still exists by the time the 
subject’s experience takes place. 
 I am not sure how plausible this response really is. However, in any case, it 
should be noted that the proponent of this reply still faces the Modal Argument, 
which we can consider presently. Suppose we grant that in those cases where the 
object ceases to exist before the experience takes place, the relevant person does 
not see anything, but only seems to see something. It can be argued that if this is 
so, then we never see the ordinary, physical objects that we seem to. But obviously 
this is not true. There are plenty of cases in which we do see the ordinary external 
objects that we seem to see. 
 Suppose, for instance, that Pauline sees an apple in world w. Now consider 
some other world w*, which is just like w except for the fact that, during the very 
small interval of time that it takes for the light leaving the apple to reach Pauline’s 
eyes, the apple is instantaneously destroyed. Now if, in general, one fails to see the 
physical object in cases wherein that object ceases to be before one’s experience 
begins, then in w* Pauline does not see the apple. The question now is whether 
Pauline sees the apple in w, i.e. in the case where the apple is not destroyed in the 
small interval of time it takes for the light leaving the apple to reach Pauline. I 
take it that the answer we want to give here is ‘yes’. However, what I wish to argue 
at this point is that if Pauline fails to see the apple in w*, then she fails to see it in 
w as well (and vice versa, i.e. if she does see the apple in w, then she sees it in w*). 
 What reason is there for thinking this? The reason is that to say otherwise 
would be to hold that Pauline has one kind of experience in w, and another, quite 
diﬀerent kind of experience in w*. Specifically, one would have to hold that whilst 
in w, Pauline has an experience that is perceptual, and consists in the presentation 
of some external thing, nevertheless in w*, Pauline has an experience that is not 
perceptual, and that does not consist in the presentation of some external thing. 
However, this view of matters does not look plausible at all. Rather, whatever kind 
of experience Pauline has in w*, she also has that kind of experience in w. For the-
se two worlds are just too similar for this not to be so. In other words, there is 
nothing that could make it the case that Pauline has a radically diﬀerent kind of 
experience in w as opposed to w*.26 
 Notice, for instance, that all the same physical relations that hold between the 
apple and Pauline in w also hold between the apple and Pauline in w*. Yet plausi-
                                                                                                                           
arbitrary point in the series when the subject comes to have an experience of a radically diﬀerent 
kind. As Broad (, p. ) puts it, ‘in view of the continuity between the most normal and the 
most abnormal cases of seeing, [i.e. veridical perceptions and illusions] such a doctrine would be 
utterly implausible and could be defended only by the most special pleading’ (cf. Robinson: , 
p. ). 
26 I assume here that the mere absence of the appropriate object is not suﬃcient for making it 
the case that Pauline has a diﬀerent kind of experience. 
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bly, the kind of experience one has is determined by the underlying physical facts, 
and, in particular, by the physical relations between the person and the experi-
enced thing. From this, however, it follows that if Pauline sees the apple in w, and 
hence has a perceptual experience of the naïve realist kind (which includes the ap-
ple as a constituent), then the same is true of Pauline in w*. Contraposing, it fol-
lows that if Pauline fails to see the apple in w*, and so fails to have a perceptual 
experience of the naïve realist kind (which includes the apple as a constituent), 
then the same is true of Pauline in w. For either the physical relations that hold 
between the apple and Pauline (in both worlds) are suﬃcient for her to see the 
apple, and hence suﬃcient for her to have a naïve realist experience including it as 
a constituent, or else they are not suﬃcient for this to be so. In short, since the 
kind of experience a person has supervenes on the physical relations that hold be-
tween the person and the object seen or sensed, there is no room to say that whilst 
Pauline has one kind of experience in w, she has an entirely diﬀerent kind of expe-
rience in w*. Hence, one cannot say that whilst Pauline sees the apple in the first 
world (i.e., w), she does not see it in the second (i.e., in w*)—since if that were so, 
then she would have to have a diﬀerent kind of experience in each world, and this 
is an implausible result.  
 The conclusion is that if indeed Pauline fails to see the apple in w*, then she 
does not see it in w. But clearly Pauline does see the apple in w. It follows that she 
sees it in w* as well—even though it (apparently) no longer exists.27  
 So rejecting () is not a viable strategy for the naïve realist. It follows that the 
naïve realist has to reject () if she is to dissolve the puzzle that we started with. 
 
  Seeing the Past 
 
I have said that the naïve realist, if she is to dissolve the puzzle we began with, has 
to reject claim (). It is initially far from clear, however, how () could be reject-
ed. For it looks to be a plain empirical fact, built unproblematically into the case, 
that the star no longer exists when you look up into the sky.  
 However, there is in fact a way of rejecting claim (). To bring this out, we 
have to take a brief detour through the metaphysics of time. 
 
. Presentism and Eternalism  
 
Perhaps the most intuitive view of time, the view that’s often said to be the view 
of commonsense, is the presentist view, according ot which only the present mo-
ment and presently existing things are real (see e.g. Markosian: , Zimmer-
man: ). The more dominant view among contemporary philosophers, how-
ever, is eternalism, according to which past, present, and future moments, along 
with past, present and future things, are all equally real (see e.g. Sider: , 
                                               
27 Why ‘apparently’? Because I’ll ultimately suggest that for the naïve realist, the best thing to 
say is that the apple still exists in w*, despite no longer being present. Likewise for the initial case 
involving the star. See (§).  
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among many others).28 Sider illustrates the diﬀerence between these two theories 
as so: 
 
According to eternalism…[j]ust as distant places are no less real for being spatially 
distant, distant times are no less real for being temporally distant; the ontological 
significance of distance is thus a respect in which time is spacelike. Reality consists 
of a four-dimensional spatiotemporal manifold of events and objects – the so-called 
‘block universe’. In the block universe, dinosaurs, computers, and future human 
outposts on Mars, are all equally real. 
        According to presentism, on the other hand, only currently existing objects 
are real. Computers, but not dinosaurs or Mars outposts, exist. (, p. )  
 
For the eternalist, Napoleon still exists. That is to say, he is still one of the things 
there are. He is a part of reality. It is just that he is located further back in the 
block universe than you or me. (For the eternalist, time is space-like. And so just 
as we can speak of things being located at various spatial positions, so too we can 
speak of things being located at various temporal regions within the four-
dimensional manifold; cf. Markosian:  and Sider: , p. .29) For the 
presentist, by contrast, this is not so. Napoleon does not exist, he is no longer a 
part of reality. For only what exists now exists at all. In short, on the presentist 
view, only the present moment and the things contained therein exist.30 (There is 
no ‘block universe’, the universe is just a slice of the eternalist’s block. And that 
slice is as it were ever changing, for when is present is ever changing!) 
 With the contrast between eternalism and presentism stated, it is now possible 
to see how the naïve realist might reject claim () driving our problem case. That 
is to say, it is possible to see how the naïve realist might reject the claim that the 
                                               
28 I set aside here an intermediate view, namely the growing block theory, on which past and 
present objects are real, but the future is not—see Broad (: II) and Tooley (). Later on, I 
recommend that naïve realists reject presentism in order to reject claim () and I write as if this 
means that naïve realists have to be eternalists. However, they could just as well adopt the growing 
block theory in order to reject claim () in the way that I recommend, or indeed any view that 
entails that the past portion of the block universe exists as well as the present one.  
29 In the current literature, it is common to use ‘exists at’ to express the relation that an object 
x stands in to a time T when x is temporally located at T. Accordingly, as Sider (, p. ) 
notes, ‘exists at’ is in such cases being used analogously to the spatial predicate ‘is located at’. In 
what follows, however, I will just speak of ‘being temporally located at’.  
 30 It might sound paradoxical to say that it is true, right now, that Napoleon exists. The eter-
nalist, however, can allow that in ordinary thought and talk, we do at least get something right by 
making claims such as ‘Napoleon does not exist’. For we can distinguish between an unrestricted 
and a restricted sense of existence. To exist in the first sense is simply to be one of the things there 
are, to be a part of reality. It is to be located somewhere within the block universe. (If we confine 
ourselves to concrete things, everything that exists is located somewhere in the space-time mani-
fold.) Whereas to exist in the second sense is to be part of reality and to be located at the present 
portion of the block universe. Now it is clear that in this second sense it is not true that Napoleon 
exists. Moreover, the eternalist can plausibly claim that what makes our ordinary claims about 
existence true, or at least ‘nearly true’, is that they track truths regarding what does and does not 
exist in this second, more restricted sense. If this is right, then the eternalist does not have to say 
that our commonsense claims about what does and what does not exist are completely mistaken. 
On the contrary, she can allow that we get something important right when we say that Napoleon 
does not exist. 
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star no longer exists. This she can do if she adopts eternalism. For if eternalism is 
true, then there is a perfectly good sense in which the star remains in existence, 
despite having exploded and died hundreds of years ago. This is because the star, 
despite not being located at the present moment, is still located somewhere within 
the four-dimensional universe.  
 
. Adopting Eternalism  
 
According to eternalism, past objects still exist. That is to say, they are a part of 
reality, despite not being located at the present moment of time. Thus, on the 
eternalist theory, Napoleon, although no longer present, still exists. He is a part 
of reality, because he is temporally located somewhere in the block universe (pre-
sumably between  and ). So it is true, now, at the present point of time, 
that Napoleon exists. He does not presently exist, insofar as he is not located in 
the present. But nonetheless he does exist and is real.  
 Suppose the naïve realist adopts this eternalist theory. It follows that she is in 
a position to reject claim (). What claim () says is that the star no longer exists. 
However, this is the case only if presentism is true. So if the naïve realist holds an 
eternalist theory, then she is able to reject claim (), and thus avoid the puzzle we 
began by setting out in (§).31 
 Let us suppose, for concreteness, that the star exploded and ‘died’ exactly 
three hundred years ago. And let us refer to the present time as t. Here is what the 
naïve realist might say if she embraces eternalism and rejects ().  
 
 
“Like most material objects, the star has a finite lifespan. It is temporally lo-
cated at a certain period, between t-n and t-, say, in the block universe. It 
is not, however, temporally located anywhere after t-, for at that point it 
explodes and ‘dies’. Nevertheless, since eternalism is true, this does not 
mean that the star does not exist at t (i.e., the present time), for (according 
to eternalism) reality encompasses more than just the present time; for in-
stance, it includes objects located in the past. So at time t, the star still ex-
ists, though it is not located at that time. At t, then, when you look up into 
the night sky, you are presented with a past object, albeit one that is no less 
real for being past. That is, you are presented with a star that still exists in 
the most general, unrestricted sense, despite not being located now. More 
                                               
31 It seems to me that it is only within an eternalist framework that we can make sense of the 
suggestion, which many philosophers have made, that in the case involving the deceased star one 
sees a past object and so in this sense sees into the past. (Philosophers who have defended this 
view include Brain: , Ebersole: , Henson:  and Pitcher: .)  
In a recent paper, Power () argues that all direct realists should endorse an eternalist po-
sition in order to handle the time-lag argument. However, it is not clear to me that every direct 
realist needs to say this. The intentionalist, for example, is not forced to adopt this view (cf. §, 
this paper). Yet, intentionalists are direct realists in Power’s sense. 
I do agree, however, that naïve realists should adopt eternalism, or at least some view of time 
on which past objects exist, at least if they are to have any chance of making sense of the sort of 
case we have been focusing on in this paper. 
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exactly, you are presented with the ‘stage’ of the star that is located at the 
region of time from which the star emitted the light that (after many years 
of travel) reaches your eyes and (after suitable cognitive processing) causes 
your perceptual experience.32 For when you looks into the sky, you see the 
star not as it is, but as it was when the light waves that caused your percep-
tual experience first began their long journey from the stage of the star that 
you now see (cf. Joad: , p. ).” 
 
Of course, to view the case in this way, the naïve realist must admit it is at least 
possible for our eyes to ‘range into the past’ (to quote Ayer: , p. ). But if 
she is an eternalist, such a claim should not be problematic; at least, no more so 
than the claim that our eyes can range into the present.33 For the past and present, 
according to eternalists, are both equally real. It may be convenient, for diﬀerent 
people at diﬀerent times, to label various parts of the block universe ‘past’ and 
‘present’—but these distinctions do not ‘carve nature at the joints’ (cf. Sider: 
). So being acquainted, in perception, with a past object ought to be no 
stranger than being acquainted with a present one. 
 It is my view that the above represents the naïve realist’s best strategy for han-
dling the problem we began with. However, this ‘eternalist’ move is by no means 
without its problems. To close this section, I want to mention three problems in 
particular. The first of these, I think, can perhaps be dealt with. The other two, 
however, pose challenges that it seems rather diﬃcult to meet (though I do not say 
they cannot be met). 
 
. Some Problems 
 
The first problem I want to mention is broadly phenomenological. On the view 
being recommended above, what happens when you look up at the sky is that 
your eyes range into the past: you are presented with some past stage of the star 
that is located at some part of the block universe that is before the present time. 
However, this is arguably not how things will appear to you when you look up 
and see the star. For intuitively, the star-stage that you see will seem to be located 
in the present, just like everything else you seem to see. As C. D. Broad (, p. 
) points out: ‘It is of the essence of a perceptual situation that it claims to re-
veal an object as it is at the time when the situation is going on’. 
 The objection, then, is that the view articulated above does not square with the 
phenomenology. When you look up into the sky, the star you see will seem to be 
                                               
32 By a ‘stage’ of the star, I mean one of its temporal parts (see Sider: ). Of course, some 
philosophers deny that material things have temporal parts, opting instead for an endurantist view 
on which objects are wholly present at each time they exist. Within an endurantist framework, 
however, it is significantly harder (albeit not impossible) to capture the plausible idea that when 
one sees an object, one sees it ‘as it was’ some time ago, i.e., at the time when the relevant portion 
of light was first emitted from it (cf. here Moore: , p. ). For simplicity in this paper I will 
continue to speak in terms of stages and temporal parts.  
 33 According to Alva Noë (, p. ), it is ‘incoherent’ to suppose that ‘we now have access 
to what has already happened’. However, this is far from obvious if we adopt an eternalist view. 
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located in the present. But on the view being proposed, the star you see (or rather, 
the relevant stage of it) is actually located in the past. 
 Now, one way to respond here would be to challenge the phenomenological 
observation. That is, one might reject Broad’s suggestion that perceptual experi-
ence claims to reveal an object as it is at the time when the perceptual experience 
is occurring. However, it seems to me that this would be misguided. To quote 
Broad once again, whilst ‘[i]t is perfectly true that…when I see a distant star, there 
is strong reason to believe that, if the situation reveals a physical object at all, it 
reveals it as it was long before the situation began, [nevertheless] the situation does 
claim to reveal the star as it now is’ (ibid). This observation, it seems to me, looks 
rather diﬃcult to resist. 
 The naïve realist thus requires an alternate response. Here is what I think 
should be said. (Though this is by no means the only option that the naïve realist 
has, as I bring out below.) In my view, the naïve realist should accommodate 
Broad’s observation at the level of judgement. (Cf. Kalderon: b on naïve real-
ism and illusion and the fact that many so-called illusions can be viewed as presen-
tations of reality as it is, whereby we apt to judge it as being some way it isn’t; see 
also Travis: . Arguably one already finds this kind of view present in Austin: 
.) That is, she should maintain that in perceptual experience, we naturally 
judge the objects we see to be compresent with our experiences of them (which 
makes it surprising to learn that this is not always the case). On this view, there is 
something illusory about your experience as of the (relevant stage of) the star, for 
the thing that you see appears to be compresent with your experience of it, whilst 
in reality this is not so. However, all this boils down to is the fact that when you 
see the star, you mistakenly judge it to be located in the present, i.e., to be co-
located (temporally speaking) with your experience of it, when this is actually not 
the case.34 
 There is another option the naïve realist might pursue at this juncture.35 This 
would be to view the case as illusory, not in the sense that it leads to mistaken 
judgements, but rather in the sense that the experience itself seems to present the 
star-stage that one sees as present when it is past—and indeed as co-present with a 
host of object-stages that strictly speaking occupy diﬀerent times. In (§), I said 
that on the naïve realist view, our perceptual experiences have relational structure: 
when S perceives an object, O, S’s experience consists in the sensory presentation 
of O to S. Some naïve realists, however, prefer a more complicated picture, ac-
cording to which the presentation relation is three- rather than two-place. Mark 
                                               
34 Compare Price () and Prichard (), according to whom, in perceptual experience 
we are given or presented with sense data (for Price) or ‘extended colours’ (for Prichard) that we 
naturally take to be or are inclined to judge as being identical to the material objects that we ‘indi-
rectly’ see when as a matter of fact this is not so. The present view is rather similar: in visually per-
ceiving the star one is presented with a past item but one naturally judges that it is temporally co-
located with one’s present experience of it. 
35 Indeed, there are as many options here as there are for naïve realists to handle illusion (for 
very helpful discussion here of the naïve realist’s options when it comes to illusion see French: 
). But in the main text I want to set out just one specific option, which follows closely the 
views of Mark Johnston when it comes to handling the illusory elements in perception from with-
in a naïve realist framework. 
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Johnston, for example, defends a view on which, when S perceives an object, O, 
S’s perceptual experience consists in the sensory presentation of O to S under a 
mode of presentation, M. More simply, for Johnston, when S sees O, her perceptu-
al experience consists in the presentation of O as F to S. (See Johnston: , 
, cf. Alston: ; for similar views on which the presentation (or acquaint-
ance) relation is three-place, see also Brewer: , Campbell: , and French: 
.) Now if one has this view, then one can accommodate Broad’s insight 
without appealing to mistaken judgement. What one can see is that when you see 
the star, your experience consists in the presentation of the star to you as com-
present with the present moment. The idea is that this would be an illusory presenta-
tion: the star-stage that you see would be located in the past, and yet presented to 
you as if you were located in the present. This view would arguably accommodate 
the relevant phenomenological insight just as well, if not better, than the view that 
tries to accommodate this insight as the level of judgement.36 
 Now, one might worry that if one responds in this way, i.e., by saying that 
Broad’s ‘insight’ merely brings out that there’s an element of illusion in certain 
cases of perceptual experience, e.g. when seeing a deceased star, then one will have 
to claim that in every case of perception, there must be an element of illusion or 
mistaken judgement, due to the fact that all perception involves a time-lag, how-
ever small that time-lag may be. For, due to the fact that all cases of seeing involve 
a time-lag, it seems to follow that whenever one sees something, one sees a past 
stage of that thing, and hence sees something that is not located in the present. In 
short, as Brain puts it, it seems to follow that whenever one sees something one 
‘sees the immediate past’ (, p. ). 
 Fortunately, however, due to the great speed at which light travels, there is no 
need for the naïve realist to hold that every case of perception involves misjudging 
the object seen as present when in reality the thing is past (or, alternatively, that 
every case of perception is illusory due to presenting past objects as present). This 
is because our concept of the present time is simply not suﬃciently fine-grained. 
As Martin Lean explains:  
 
…the period of time intended in the common sense belief that the objects we see 
are ‘there’ when and as we see them, is not a theoretical instant, but is rather an ap-
preciable duration. The time required for the light to reach our eyes from nearby 
objects is so minute as to defy even careful scientific measurement, let alone unaid-
ed perceptual discrimination; and hence it is well within the roughly defined limits 
intended in the common-sense belief. (, p. , cf. Lemos: , p. , and 
Phillips: , fn. ) 
 
In short, in whatever sense it’s true to say that we see things as being present (and 
so as being simultaneous with our act of seeing them), this is compatible with our 
seeing portions or stages of things that are located a fraction of a second earlier in 
the block universe than our experiences of them. The upshot is that we need not 
convict our perceptual experiences (and/or our immediate judgements about 
them) of massive and systemic error. The things we see appear to be simultaneous 
                                               
36 For Johnston, it is essential that the naïve realist recognise illusory manners of presentation 
in any case. For naïve realists who agree with this, the line of thought just mentioned may well 
constitute the more preferable response. 
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with our experiences of them, they appear to be present; and for the most part the 
appearances do not mislead.  
 I turn now to what seems to me a more serious objection. On the view being 
considered, when you look up into the sky, you see the star as it was three hun-
dred years ago. Again, this can be put by saying that you see the t- stage of the 
star. But now suppose that when you see the t-  star-stage your hand is also 
within your of vision. Since it takes time for light to travel, you see your hand as 
it was a fraction of a second earlier. That is, you see the t- stage of your hand. 
Now the problem is that the following two claims seem to be true: 
  
 (A) If two physical objects are within your field of vision, then those things  
  are spatially related to each other.  
 
 (B) Two things cannot be spatially related unless they both exist at the same  
   time, i.e., unless they are both located at the same instant of time in the  
  block universe.  
 
The trouble, of course, is that (A) and (B) can’t both be true, given that you see 
both the t- stage of the star and the t- stage of your hand. For these two items 
are not co-present with each other. That is to say, they do not exist at the same 
time, and hence cannot be spatially related, by (B). This means that, given (B), we 
must accept that (A) is false. Yet once again, claim (A) seems to be an obvious 
truth.37  
 The problem here is quite general. Once one maintains that in all cases, when 
one sees something, one sees it as it was some time ago—i.e., one sees some past 
stage of it, whereby which stage of the thing you see depends on how long it took 
for the relevant portion of light to reach your eyes—one has to grant that the var-
ious things in one’s field of vision need not all be located at the same instant of 
time. But once one grants this, it seems hard to retain the seemingly obvious 
truth that any two physical objects within one’s field of vision must be spatially 
related to each other. For it seems clear that to be spatially related, two things 
have to be located at the same instant of time.38 
 I confess that it is not entirely clear to me how to handle this problem. One 
option, of course, is to give up the idea that in order to be spatially related to one 
another, things have to be located at the same time (for a defence of this manoeu-
vre, see Power: ). The obvious trouble, however, is that the idea that only 
                                               
37 Note that by ‘field of vision’ here I just mean the fusion or collection of the things one is 
now seeing, including the regions of space they occupy (if the locations of things can be seen as 
well). (As Johnston:  points out, in this sense the term ‘field of vision’ is relatively innocuous, 
and does not commit us to the existence of a strange sort of ‘mental space’.) However, we could in 
principle get by without bringing in the notion of a visual field. The alternative argument would 
run by drawing on this alternative first premise, namely: (A*) If two physical objects are being 
seen by you, then they are spatially related. The second premise, (B), would stay the same, and the 
problem would still emerge: for these two premises, (A*) and the original (B), would jointly imply 
the falsehood that the star-stage you see is co-located with the hand-stage that you see. 
38 This problem was first noted, I believe, by Houts (), in connection with the answer to 
the time-lag argument suggestion by Pitcher ().  
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compresent objects can be spatially related seems very plausible. But then the only 
other option is to deny that all the thing’s within one’s field of vision must be 
spatially related to each other. Yet to deny that claim can seem equally implausi-
ble—at any rate, there is something compelling about the idea that all of the 
things that I can see form as it were a unity or a collection of items all spatially 
related to each other; one might even think one can see their spatial relations. 
Thus, the proponent of the eternalist strategy faces real a challenge here. It do not 
call it unassailable, but we do have two premises, (A) and (B), and both look ra-
ther compelling; yet they are jointly incompatible, and it is hard to see why one 
the naïve realist (who embraces the eternalist strategy) should give up, or how to 
go about it.39  
 I come now to the third and final problem. Perceptual experiences are quite 
clearly events which have temporal duration. With that in mind, suppose now 
that when you look up at the sky, you gaze at the star for a period of five minutes, 
so that your experience lasts for the period of time between t and t’. Plausibly, it 
follows that your experience itself lasts for five minutes. But now recall that the 
stage of the star you see is located at t-. And recall also that for the naïve realist, 
our perceptual experiences contain as constituents the objects of perception. It 
follows that an item located at t- is a constituent of an experience that begins 
way after t-, and which obtains between t and t’. Therefore it follows that there 
exists an experience that lasts between t and t’ and which has as a constituent an 
item located many years before that experience even begins. 
 The trouble, in short, is that one could be forgiven for finding this picture of 
things absurd. For, to adapt an example taken from Power (, p. ), this 
seems like supposing a violin player might be a constituent of an event that is a 
performance of a Beethoven concerto, despite not being temporally located at the 
time of the performance. But that idea does seem incredible. In short, it seems 
rather plausible to hold that quite generally, if an event occurs between two times 
T and T, then all the constituents of that event must be located between T 
and T. But the naïve realist has to reject this if she adopts the view that in the 
star case, you are acquainted with a past object (namely the t- stage of the star). 
                                               
39 On the other hand, however, given that the ‘field of view’ is just the fusion or collection of 
all of the things one sees, maybe it’s not that hard to deny (A), i.e. the claim all of the things in 
one’s field of view are all spatially related—especially once one grants that one can see past objects, 
so that the field of vision comprises (in some cases) the fusion or collection of objects (or stages 
thereof) that are located at diﬀerent temporal regions. In short, perhaps the naïve realist could 
turn the argument on its head and reason thus: only compresent objects can be spatially related 
(premise (B)); but your field of vision (in the star case) contains objects that are not compresent; it 
is not the case that all of the objects in one’s field of vision must be spatially related to each other 
(contra premise (A)). Perhaps this is the right way for the naïve realist to go; I remain, however, 
not entirely sure at the present juncture. (One might also note that perhaps in some cases one can 
see auras and the like, as migraine suﬀers do, cf. Johnston: manuscript-a). Arguably in such a case 
one is having a perceptual experience that will typically involve seeing other external items like 
your hand and so on—but if the auras are real, then they are not going to turn out to be spatially 
related to the external items! (Johnston says they lack spatial location altogether, and I say they are 
in a kind of relational or Leibnizean mental space—see Moran manuscript.) So this is another line 
of argument one might push against premises (A) or (A*). You need non-spatial items that can be 
seen, and seen at the same time as spatially located items. (Would properties do the trick?). 
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 Now one way out of this diﬃculty would be to deny that your experience of 
the star occurs only between t and t’. Specifically, one could claim that your expe-
rience reaches all the way back to the emission of light from the star at a certain 
time (viz. at t-), due to being constituted by the entire causal processes begin-
ning at that point. Mark Johnston recommends a view of this sort. Against the 
idea that visual experiences are the causal upshot of light travelling, hitting the 
retina, and suitable cognitive processing, etc., Johnston says the following: 
 
[T]he relation between seeing an object and the long physical process involving first 
the light coming from the object and then the operation of the visual system is not 
the relation between a first mental eﬀect and a prior physical process that causes it. 
Seeing the object is not the next event after the visual system operates. Seeing the 
object is an event materially constituted by the long physical process connecting the 
object seen to the final state of the visual system. Seeing the object is an event that 
is (as it actually turns out) constituted by a physical process that goes all the way 
out to the object seen. (: pp. —)40 
 
Now if our experiences are temporally extended in this way, then the naïve realist 
does not face the worry that some of our experiences have constituents that are 
located earlier in the block universe than our experiences of those objects. This is 
because our experiences of the objects will stretch suﬃciently far back in time to 
encompass all of the things that we perceive. 
 The trouble, however, is that this view has the rather implausible upshot that 
in some cases, our perceptual experiences last much longer than they appear to. 
Suppose I look at the sun for three seconds. It is natural to think that my experi-
ence lasts for only three seconds.41 But it takes (approximately) eight minutes for 
the light that (partly) causes my experience to reach my eyes. So Johnston must 
say that my experience lasts over eight minutes long! Things are even worse when 
it comes to perceiving stars that are light-years away. For, according to Johnston’s 
view, if I look up at this star for ten minutes, then my experience must go on for 
years! Yet surely this is unacceptable. (Indeed as Dretske: , p.  and Martin: 
, p.  both point out, if our experiences are constituted by the entire caus-
al process, beginning with light leaving the object, then in some cases, our own 
perceptual experiences begin before we are even born. But that really does look 
absurd.42) 
 A better move, it seems to me, would be to deny that it is absurd to think an 
experience occurring for some stretch of time might have as a constituent an ob-
                                               
40 This kind of view is specifically recommended by Hirst (, p. ) in connection with 
the present diﬃculty. Similar views are also recommended (for other reasons) by Child (, p. 
; , pp. —) and Snowdon (, p. ; , p. ; b, p. ).  
41 For a compelling defence of the general thesis that our perceptual experiences inherit their 
temporal properties (including their duration) from the temporal properties of their objects (or 
apparent objects in non-veridical cases) see Phillips ().  
42 Johnston has suggested (in personal correspondence) that this objection fails, since it fails 
to mention that on his view, the perceptual experience itself, despite being constituted by the long 
causal process, is also ‘an achievement occurring only at the completion of the process’. However, 
it is hard to know what to make of this response. How could the experience be constituted by a 
certain physical process and yet begin only at the end of that process?   
  
ject temporally located prior to that stretch of time.43 Again, what the naïve realist 
maintains is that experiences are relational events, i.e., events that are constituted 
by the holding of a relation (between a subject and an object). So once the naïve 
realist allows that the relation of acquaintance can hold at some time, t between 
(the stage of) a person located at t and some (stage of an) object of perception lo-
cated prior to t, it would be natural for her to hold that experiences can have as 
constituents objects that are not compresent with the experiences they are constit-
uents of. (True, it seems absurd to think that a violinist could be a constituent of a 
musical performance without existing at the same time as the performance. But 
perhaps objects of perception are not constituents of experiences in the same way 
that violin players are constituents of performances.) 
 Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that we face a diﬃculty here. It does 
seem plausible to think that if an event takes place between T and T, then it 
can only have as constituents items that are located between those times. If that is 
right, however, then the naïve realist cannot handle the problem case we have 
been considering in this paper via rejecting () in the manner suggested in this 
section, given her commitment to the idea that perceived objects are literally con-
stituents of our perceptual experiences.44  
 
  Conclusion   
 
In this paper, we have been concerned with a puzzle that arises in connection 
with a certain case, wherein you look up at the sky and see a star that (apparently) 
no longer exists. The trouble is that whilst it’s natural to treat the case as one in 
which you see a no longer existent item, that description entails the falsity of a 
very plausible principle, which states that only existent items are able to be seen 
(see §). 
 The traditional way to handle this type of case is to adopt a sense datum theo-
ry of perceptual experience—or more generally, to adopt some form of Conjunc-
tivism. In this paper, however, I have explored the options that a proponent of 
naïve realism has for handling this type of case. My main conclusion is that the 
best option for the naïve realist is to reject the claim that the item you see does 
not exist. On this view of matters, the thing you see is a past object—and in par-
ticular, a past stage or temporal part of the relevant star—which still exists and is 
real given an eternalist view of time. 
                                               
43 This is flagged as an option for the naïve realist by Fish (, p. ). Fish stops short of 
endorsing this response, however. 
44 There is perhaps a third way to respond to the diﬃculty. This is to deny that experiences 
are events that take place in time at all. One way to do this would be to acknowledge that experi-
ences exist, but deny that they have temporal extent. (Stoneham:  argues that this was Berke-
ley’s view in the Three Dialogues. See also Pylyshyn: .) Another way would be to deny that 
there are, strictly speaking, any experiences at all. (In a recent paper, Stoneham:  argues that 
one can develop the naïve realist view without being committed to the reality of experiential 
events. If this is right, then one could sidestep the present worry completely. It seems to me, how-
ever, that there are such things as perceptual experiences, and that these do have temporal extent. 
So I believe that neither version of this third move is a plausible one to make. However, there is 
unfortunately no space to discuss these issues any further here. 
  
 This view, however, is not without its problems, as we saw in the previous sec-
tion. For it is hard to square this view with both the plausible thought that all the 
things within one’s field of view (i.e. all of the thing’s one sees at a given time) are 
spatially related to each other, and also with the core naïve realist thesis that the 
objects one sees are constituents of one’s perceptual experience. A further conclu-
sion we have to draw, therefore, is that it is somewhat unclear whether the naïve 
realist can oﬀer a satisfactory account of our initial case. As someone attracted to 
naïve realism, this is not exactly a conclusion I am happy with. It just might be, 
however, that the traditional, Conjunctivist reply to the time-lag argument is ul-
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